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Abstract 
 
Personal control and agency are closely associated with the counterfactual notion that a 
person could have done otherwise (CDO). In both philosophy and law, this counterfactual 
evaluation determines responsibility and punishment, yet little is known about its influence 
on agents’ experience during action. We used a risky decision-making task to study how 
counterfactual evaluations influenced participants’ sense of agency. Two factors were 
manipulated independently: the presence/absence of counterfactual comparisons between 
actions and the presence/absence of counterfactual comparisons between outcomes of these 
actions. Perceived agency was highest when both counterfactual comparisons were available. 
Interestingly, this pattern persisted even when counterfactual information was only revealed 
after action, suggesting a purely reconstructive evaluation effect. These findings allow a more 
precise phrasing of the CDO element of personal agency: a person feels most control when 
she could have performed another action, thereby obtaining another outcome. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling of controlling events in the outside world by 
one’s own action (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). This notion of personal control is associated with 
the feeling of being a causal agent who actively shapes the world (Frith, 2014). One 
particularly important cue to such notion of personal causality is counterfactual thinking – the 
mental evaluation of possible but unrealised alternatives (Lewis, 1986). According to the 
counterfactual theory of causation, an action causes an outcome, if both action and outcome 
occur, and the outcome would not have occurred without the action (Mackie, 1974). Hence, 
establishing a causal link between two events requires a counterfactual evaluation. This 
suggests that counterfactual comparisons might play an important role for agency 
attributions, as sense of agency potentially reduces to ascription of causation to oneself (de 
Biran, 1841). Despite this close link between agency, causality and counterfactual thought, 
the direct influence of counterfactual thinking on the subjective experience of agency during 
action remains poorly studied (but see Dannenberg, Förster & Jostmann, 2012 on the 
influence of counterfactual thinking on illusory authorship and Desantis, Roussel & Waszak 
on a link between causation and sense of agency). If sense of agency relies on attributions of 
personal causation derived from counterfactual thinking, then the availability of 
counterfactual comparisons should directly increase SoA, even if such comparisons have no 
effect on objective control, that is the likelihood to obtain the desired outcome. The present 
study used a risky decision-making task to investigate how comparisons between factual and 
counterfactual action and outcome alternatives influenced participants’ sense of agency 
during active decision-making. 
Counterfactual thinking refers to the mental evaluation of the way things might have 
happened, as opposed to how they actually did happen (Byrne, 2005). Counterfactuals 
simulate how changes to the past would have affected the subsequent course of events, 
potentially leading to a different present. Such thought experiments help to identify causal 
relations, especially when events have already occurred and will not re-occur in exactly the 
same way (Byrne, 2016). With regard to agency and personal control, the counterfactual 
thought “I could have done otherwise” (CDO) holds particular theoretical importance 
(Frankfurt, 1988). Influential models of legal and moral reasoning consider the CDO 
evaluation as an important test whether somebody personally and deliberately caused an 
outcome, and consequently should be held responsible for it (Pereboom, 2011). The 
evaluation of CDO type counterfactuals therefore seems particularly important for the 
ascription of agency, as a satisfied CDO condition might directly increase the sense of agency. 
However, no previous study has investigated whether actions made under CDO conditions 
indeed produce an altered sense of agency compared to actions not so made.  
One obstacle to the empirical investigation of CDO type comparisons is a rather vague 
meaning of “could have done otherwise”. Doing otherwise can either refer to performing a 
different action, or obtaining a different outcome, or both. The CDO requirement can thus be 
interpreted as having counterfactual between-action alternatives (“I could have performed 
another action”), or refer to available between-outcome alternatives (“I could have obtained 
another outcome”). In the present study we developed a paradigm which allowed us to 
manipulate these two aspects independently. This allowed us to study how available action 
and/or outcome alternatives informed the sense of agency via a counterfactual evaluation of 
personal causality. 
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In an active choice task participants made risky decisions between two button presses 
which resulted in positive or negative outcomes, respectively. The availability of 
counterfactual between-action and between-outcome alternatives was introduced as two 
independent factors. Participants could either make free choices between two buttons, or 
were instructed to select one specified button. This contrast defined the factor of 
counterfactual action alternatives (“I could have performed another action”) at the point of 
action selection. Counterfactual outcome alternatives were introduced by informing 
participants whether the two actions would result in identical or opposite outcomes. The 
consideration “I could have obtained another outcome” was true for opposite outcomes, but 
false if the outcomes associated with both actions were identical. Counterfactual outcome 
alternatives were potentially available for free choices. However, the counterfactual outcome 
was not truly obtainable when the action was instructed. 
In two experiments we further manipulated the time within the course of action at 
which counterfactual outcome information was provided. This allowed us to investigate 
whether purely retrospective (“I could have obtained a different outcome (but now I no longer 
can)”) or potentially prospective (“I can obtain different outcomes”) evaluations of outcome 
alternatives influenced sense of agency in a different way. 
Importantly, participants had no objective control over the outcomes they obtained 
during the task because outcome assignment was random. In the absence of learnable action-
outcome contingencies counterfactual comparisons could not be used to direct action 
choices, thereby preventing any adaptive preparatory function of counterfactual evaluations 
which could increase participant’s task success (Epstude & Roese, 2008). Furthermore, our 
task did not explicitly instruct participants to generate or evaluate counterfactuals, unlike 
most previous studies of counterfactual thinking and reasoning (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 
1986). Instead, we reasoned that simply providing information about un-selected or un-
obtained alternatives would trigger implicit counterfactual comparisons. Previous findings 
suggest that such implicit tracking of counterfactual alternatives does indeed occur. For 
example, the valence of un-obtained gamble outcomes strongly influences satisfaction with 
the outcomes that were actually obtained (Camille et al., 2004; Zeelenberg et al., 1998). 
However, it remains unclear whether similar comparisons operate with respect to sense of 
agency evaluations.  
The sense of agency was assessed with explicit and implicit measures. Explicit SoA was 
measured by explicit ratings of degree of control (Chambon et al., 2013), while implicit SoA 
was assessed with an intentional binding measure (Engbert, Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2008). 
Intentional binding refers to the effect that stronger sense of agency shifts action and 
outcome closer together in subjective time (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). This leads 
participants to underestimate the temporal interval between personally controlled actions 
and their outcomes, while durations of action-outcome intervals between outcomes 
following externally triggered actions are in turn over-estimated (see Moore & Obhi, 2012 for 
review). Both explicit and implicit measures of agency have been widely employed in research 
on volition and agency, but have not previously been used to study counterfactual 
comparisons in decision-making tasks. While explicit measures reflect sense of agency 
judgments informed by contextual cues and propositional beliefs, intentional binding is 
assumed to arise from an integration of lower-level perceptual and motor cues which are less 
susceptible to cognitive bias (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008).  
We were particularly interested in the interplay between counterfactual action and 
outcome alternatives and the influence these manipulations would have on our measures of 
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sense of agency, as this relation would clarify how these two components of the “could have 
done otherwise” requirement affect the sense of personal control.  
 
 
2. Experiment 1 
 
2.1. Material and Methods 
 
2.1.1. Participants 
19 participants (12 females, average age 23 years) took part in Experiment 1. The sample size 
was determined by an a priori power analysis (G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007) in order to detect a strong (f = .40) significant main effect or interaction with the 
settings of power = .90 and alpha level = .05. Participants provided informed consent and 
received £10.50 for participation. The study was approved by the local ethics review board. 
 
2.1.2. Procedure 
Participants were playing a risky decision-making game on a computer (see Figure 1). Each 
trial presented a cartoon mouse facing two mouse holes and participants selected to which 
mouse hole the mouse would go. If both mouse holes had identical shades of grey, this 
indicated that they would have identical outcomes, whereas different shades of grey 
indicated opposite outcomes. In half the trials participants chose freely between the two 
mouse holes. In the remaining trials participants were instructed by a black circle that only 
one mouse hole could be selected. Participants pressed the left or right arrow on a keyboard 
with their right hand, corresponding to the left and right mouse holes, respectively. After a 
variable time interval (100/400/700 ms) the outcomes of both chosen and un-chosen actions 
were presented visually by a change in colour of the mouse holes. Two outcomes were 
possible: holes that turned green indicated a positive outcome, signifying that the mouse 
survived and participants were rewarded 20p. Red holes represented negative outcomes, 
indicating that the mouse died and participants lost 18p. A tone (500 Hz, 50 ms) accompanied 
the colour change. After outcome presentation, participants estimated the time interval that 
passed between their key-press and the tone, which constituted the interval estimation 
measure of intentional binding (for detailed methods see Caspar, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 
2015). Finally, participants gave an explicit rating over the amount of personal control they 
perceived over the obtained outcome on a 9-point scale. 
The task design consisted of three factors: action selection (free, instructed) × 
outcome valence (positive, negative) × counterfactual outcome (identical, opposite), giving a 
total of eight experimental conditions. Each condition was presented 36 times per participant, 
resulting in 288 trials in total. Trials were presented randomised in three blocks of 96 trials 
each. The probability of obtaining a positive or negative outcome was 50% throughout the 
whole experiment and did not differ between conditions. Restricting outcome probability to 
chance prevented participants from learning to predict outcomes and adjusting action 
selection accordingly. Counterfactual information thus could not assist task performance. All 
combinations of experimental condition, shadings of grey and time intervals were 
counterbalanced and appeared with equal frequency.  
 
2.2. Results 
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2.2.1. Explicit control ratings 
Explicit control ratings were entered in a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA (see Figure 2). 
Participants reported higher agency in free choice compared to instructed trials (F(1,18) = 
33.09, p < .001, ηp² =.65). Furthermore, agency ratings were higher in the presence of opposite 
compared to identical counterfactual outcomes (F(1,18) = 20.53, p < .001, ηp² = .53). However, 
opposite counterfactual outcomes only increased agency in free (t(18) = 4.68, p < .001) but 
not instructed trials (t(18) = 0), as indicated by an action selection × counterfactual outcome 
interaction (F(1,18) = 22.52, p < .001, ηp² = .56). Control ratings were generally higher 
following positive compared to negative outcomes (F(1,18) = 21.05, p < .001, ηp² = .54). This 
effect was stronger in free (t(18) = 4.70, p < .001) compared to instructed trials (t(18) = 3.63, 
p = .002), as indicated by an action selection × outcome valence interaction (F(1,18) = 4.80, p 
= .04, ηp² = .21). 
 
2.2.2. Interval estimation 
Mean normalised interval duration estimations between action and outcome were entered 
into a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA (Figure 2). Time intervals were perceived as longer 
in free choice trials (F(1,18) = 5.98, p = .025, ηp² = .25). Opposite counterfactual outcomes also 
increased interval estimations (F(1,18) = 15.24, p = .001, ηp² = .46). Intentional binding effects 
thus did not correspond with explicit control ratings. In particular, factors that increased 
explicit agency ratings did not produce shorter perceived intervals, as might be predicted, but 
showed the reverse pattern. To identify potential confounding factors, we analysed action 
selection decision-times. 
 
2.2.3. Decision-times 
Decision-times were defined as the interval between trial onset and button press. After 
excluding responses faster than 100 ms and longer than 2 SD above mean, decision-times 
were analysed with a 2 (action selection) × 2 (counterfactual outcome) repeated measures 
ANOVA (Figure 2). Both main effects of action selection (F(1,18) = 17.44, p = .001, ηp² = .49) 
and counterfactual outcome (F(1,18) = 15.73, p = .001, ηp² = .47) were qualified by a significant 
interaction (F(1,18) = 24.30, p < .001, ηp² = .58), suggesting longer decision-times in trials with 
opposite compared to identical counterfactual outcomes, but only if actions were selected 
freely (t(18) = 4.46, p < .001) rather than being instructed (t(18) < 1).  
 
2.3. Discussion Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 showed that available between-action and between-outcome comparisons 
increased sense of agency. Explicit sense of agency was higher in the presence of available 
action alternatives. In contrast, the availability of outcome alternatives only increased SoA 
when the action that would have led to the counterfactual outcome had previously been 
available (i.e., in free choice but not instructed choice conditions). These findings provide first 
evidence that the availability of counterfactual comparisons can increase the sense of 
personal control and agency. However, Experiment 1 does not distinguish between two 
possible mechanisms of agency, a prospective or a retrospective one (Moore & Haggard, 
2008). As the availability of action and outcome alternatives was evident at the start of the 
trial and prior to action selection, participants could have evaluated the different actions and 
outcomes in advance. This possibly allowed prospective estimates of control based on the 
extent to which action-selection could influence events. Decision-time data suggests that the 
combination of free choice and a differential outcome indeed engaged a specific process of 
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outcome-based action selection. Alternatively, agency judgments could also have been 
evaluated after action-selection, based on comparing the actual outcome with the outcome 
that could have been obtained. On a strict interpretation, only the latter, retrospective, 
evaluation would constitute a truly counterfactual effect (Byrne & Egan, 2004). We set out to 
distinguish between these two components in Experiment 2.  
 
 
3. Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 2 involved a modified version of the task, in which presentation of outcome 
alternatives was delayed until after action-selection. If the increase in SoA observed in 
Experiment 1 reflected a true counterfactual, as opposed to prospective evaluation of 
alternative outcomes known in advance, then Experiment 2 should reproduce the agency 
pattern observed in Experiment 1. 
 
3.1. Material and Methods 
 
3.1.1. Participants 
20 participants (10 females, average age 23 years) participated in Experiment 2. Just as in 
Experiment 1, participants provided informed consent and received £10.50 for participation. 
 
3.1.2. Procedure 
The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except that counterfactual 
outcome information was only available at the point of outcome presentation (see Figure 1). 
All trials started with a selection between two differently shaded mouse holes. After action 
selection, identical or opposite outcome colours revealed whether chosen and un-chosen 
actions had identical or opposite outcomes. This manipulation ensured that counterfactual 
outcome information informed sense of agency in purely retrospective way. 
 
3.2. Results 
 
3.2.1. Explicit control ratings 
Similar to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 agency ratings were higher in free compared to 
instructed trials (F(1,19) = 32.57, p < .001, ηp² = .63) (see Figure 2). Agency was higher in trials 
with opposite compared to identical counterfactual outcomes (F(1,19) = 12.46, p = .002, ηp² 
= .40). Again, opposite counterfactual outcomes only increased control ratings in free (t(19) = 
3.93, p = .001) but not instructed trials (t(19) < 1), as indicated by an action selection × 
outcome alternative interaction (F(1,19) = 13.44, p = .002, ηp² = .41). Agency ratings were 
higher following positive compared to negative outcomes (F(1,19) = 24.55, p < .001, ηp² = .56). 
To compare the two experiments directly, a Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA 
(JSASP, JASP Team, 2016) was performed. It showed moderate to strong support for the null 
hypothesis regarding all interactions including the between-subject factor experiment (all 
BF01 > 6), suggesting that control rating patterns did not differ between Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
3.2.2. Interval estimation 
Mean normalised interval duration estimations between action and outcome were entered 
into a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA (Figure 2). An outcome valence × counterfactual 
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outcome interaction (F(1,19) = 5.30, p = .033, ηp² = .22) indicated different directions of the 
outcome valence effect as a function of counterfactual outcome. However, pairwise 
comparison between positive and negative outcomes did neither reach significance in 
identical (t(19) = 1.10, p = .28) nor in opposite counterfactual outcomes (t(19) = -1.20, p = .24). 
 
3.2.3. Decision-times 
A main effect of action selection (F(1,19) = 24.21, p < .001 ,ηp² = .56) indicated longer decision-
times in free choice trials (see Figure 2). Similar to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 decision-
times thus showed a pattern that was similar to the pattern observed for interval estimations: 
choices which required longer decisions were followed by longer interval estimations. 
Heightened attention and arousal in trials with high anticipated agency might explain this 
relationship, as these factors can increase perceived temporal durations (Eagleman, 2008). 
Intentional binding, the implicit measure of SoA, can thus be assumed to be confounded with 
decision-times, which possibly occludes further effects. We therefore refrain from 
interpreting the intentional binding results of both experiments and to focus the discussion 
on explicit agency rating findings. 
 
3.3. Discussion Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 replicated the pattern of agency ratings that were observed in Experiment 1. 
This suggests that a purely retrospective, genuinely counterfactual, evaluation of between-
outcome alternatives is sufficient to increase subjective sense of agency ratings. 
 
 
4. General Discussion 
 
In the present paper we investigated how the sense of agency is influenced by the presence 
or absence of counterfactual comparisons between alternative actions, and between 
alternative outcomes that these actions produce. These comparisons constitute two essential 
yet distinct aspects of the could have done otherwise requirement of personal control and 
responsibility. Our results reveal two novel findings. 
First, we found that explicit sense of control over the outcome of one’s action was 
highest following trials which allowed both between-action and between-outcome 
comparisons. This is consistent with the role of explicit counterfactual thinking in the 
evaluation of outcome preventability (Mandel & Lehman, 1996). Preventable or inhibitory 
causes are the personally controllable subset of all causes that contribute to an event, and 
are therefore informative cues to personal causation (Lagnado, Gerstenberg & Zultan, 2013). 
Accordingly, sense of agency was highest when outcomes were perceived as preventable, 
that is when the agent could have performed another action which in turn would have 
resulted in a different outcome. This finding allows to reformulate the CDO requirement to 
the perception of personal causation and agency in a more precise way: “I could have 
performed another action, thereby obtaining another outcome”. Interestingly, counterfactual 
outcome alternatives only informed agency if they were consequences of actually viable (i.e., 
potentially selectable) action alternatives, whereas counterfactual outcomes of unavailable 
actions did not affect SoA. Counterfactual comparisons thus focused on realistic alternatives 
constrained by task structure, following the nearest possible world constraint (Lewis, 1973; 
Woodward, 2011). In this sense, explicit judgements of agency are well-aligned with the 
concept of causal control. 
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The second main finding clarifies the time-course of counterfactual influences on 
sense of agency. We show that counterfactual outcome information influences sense of 
agency whether it is presented early in the action-outcome sequence, at the point of action 
selection (Experiment 1), or only later when action is complete and the outcome is presented 
(Experiment 2). This suggests that counterfactual alternatives need not necessarily be 
considered at the point of action selection to influence sense of agency – consideration at the 
point of outcome presentation is sufficient. Counterfactual outcome alternatives thus affect 
judgements of agency over actions already made in a purely retrospective way, and without 
reference to action-selection processes. 
At first sight it might seem surprising that retrospectively available outcome 
information increases sense of agency. This is at odds with findings that thinking 
counterfactually about situations in which one “could not have known better” can reduce 
perceived control. Such excuse-making effects have been shown to emphasise that an 
outcome was inevitable because of lacking relevant information (Markman & Tetlock, 2000). 
Similar reasoning patterns may underlie the tendency to preserve a positive self-evaluation 
in the face of failure (Festinger, 1962). While some studies show that such short-term 
affective benefits can be dedrimental to future perfromance by decreasing the motivation to 
prevent future negative outcomes (McCrea, 2008), other findings suggest that 
counterfactuals that increase the feeling of control can in fact increase subsequent motivation 
and performance (Nasco & Marsh, 1999). 
On standard views, explicit counterfactual thoughts are primarily activated by 
negative outcomes such as failed goals and serve to evaluate how these outcomes could have 
turned out better (Epstude & Roese, 2008). These counterfactuals are termed upward 
counterfactuals and are assumed to regulate behaviour via two mechanisms: by transforming 
previous experience into behavioural plans for the future (i.e., learning) and by increasing 
”affect-fuelled motivation” (Epstude & Roese, 2011, p. 21) as outlined above. However, 
neither mechanism seems to fully explain the present findings. Firstly, our task precluded the 
possibility of using counterfactual information as a learning signal because of random action-
outcome mapping. Available counterfactual comparisons thus could not have activated 
behavioural intentions that in turn increased objective performance and control in 
subsequent trials (Smallman, 2013, Smallman & Roese, 2009). In this sense, our design broke 
the conventional linkage between counterfactuals and outcome-based learning. Second, 
while motivational or affective regulation may be adaptive after an error, its effects should 
reverse following positive outcomes, leading to downward counterfactuals which evaluate 
less desirable potential courses of events. As such, positive outcomes should have reduced 
perceived control by making potential failures more salient. However, this pattern was not 
observed in our studies. In particular, control ratings were not affected by actual outcome 
valence and the resulting direction of counterfactual comparisons. 
This suggests that the implicit CDO type counterfactual comparisons encouraged by 
our task differed from previously studied instances of motivational-affective regulation by 
explicit counterfactual thinking. In particular, the active nature of the employed decision-
making task and the personally relevant and tangible outcomes might have led to a 
differential type of processing compared to hypothetical vignettes previously used in the 
investigation of explicit counterfactual thinking and control. We hypothesise that the present 
implicit counterfactual comparisons were related to the online tracking of agency and causal 
control during active decision-making. Nevertheless, the retrospective nature of these 
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evaluations shown in Experiment 2 is compatible with a view of explicit counterfactual 
evaluations as a part of the post-actional phase (Epstude & Roese 2008). 
Taken together, our findings demonstrate that the availability of counterfactual 
comparisons in an active choice task directly influences SoA, even if this counterfactual 
information promotes neither learning nor affective-motivational regulation. We found that 
CDO type evaluations increase the perceived control over action outcomes when two 
independent conditions are met. First, the agent could have chosen an alternative action. 
Second, this action would have changed the outcome. This finding suggests a strong, possibly 
automatic mind-set for agency and personal causation, even in the absence of objective 
control over action outcomes. 
 In addition to these key findings, explicit agency ratings in both experiments 
confirmed two well-documented evaluative biases, namely the self-serving bias and the 
illusion of control. Regarding self-serving bias, we found higher agency ratings for positive 
compared to negative outcomes (Bandura, 1984). This effect persisted even in instructed 
trials, suggesting that it was only influenced by actually obtained outcomes, while neither the 
actions leading to these outcomes nor counterfactual outcomes were considered. Self-serving 
bias was thus decoupled from actual control and CDO evaluations. The second bias – illusion 
of control – refers to stronger perceived control over the outcome in the presence of free 
choices, even when outcomes are solely determined by chance (Langer, 1975). In the present 
study it manifested in higher agency ratings in free compared to instructed choices between 
identical alternatives, as here choice could not affect outcome. The illusion of control has 
previously been attributed to a general confusion of skill and chance (Stefan & David, 2013). 
However, it also involves a counterfactual between-action comparison (“I could have chosen 
another action”). Free choice situations therefore partly satisfy the CDO requirement, which 
possibly increases perceived agency. The illusion of control might thus be a by-product of 
CDO-type evaluation of action alternatives which helps to monitor agents’ SoA during active 
decision-making. As such, available between-action CDO evaluations seem to influence sense 
of agency, even when there is clear evidence against between-outcome CDO. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The present study tested the direct influence of available counterfactual comparisons on the 
sense of agency. By independently manipulating information about available counterfactual 
actions and counterfactual outcomes, we identified the specific contribution of each. We 
thereby clarified the could have done otherwise requirement for judgements of agency. Our 
key result is that SoA was strongest when participants knew both that they could choose 
between alternative actions, and that this choice would produce alternative outcomes. 
Importantly, this combined effect of both alternative actions and alternative outcomes was 
present even when outcome alternatives were presented after actions were already made. 
This finding strongly suggests that CDO effects on SoA are retrospective reconstructions. In 
this sense, the CDO aspect of SoA seems to relate to general beliefs about one’s own causal 
capacity rather than to the online control of the current action. These new findings allow a 
more precise phrasing of the CDO requirement, which we express by the counterfactual 
statement that the agent could have performed another action, thereby obtaining another 
outcome. 
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